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Abstract
We present a quantum probabilistic encryption algorithm for a private-key
encryption scheme based on conjugate coding of the qubit string. A prob-
abilistic encryption algorithm is generally adopted in public-key encryption
protocols. Here we consider the way it increases the unicity distance of both
classical and quantum private-key encryption schemes. The security of quan-
tum probabilistic private-key encryption schemes against two kinds of attacks
is analyzed. By using the no-signalling postulate, we show that the scheme
can resist attack to the key. The scheme’s security against plaintext attack
is also investigated by considering the information-theoretic indistinguisha-
bility of the encryption scheme. Finally, we make a conjecture regarding
Breidbart’s attack.
1. Introduction
Public-key cryptosystems were first proposed in the 1970s [1, 2]. Because
the original public-key encryption schemes were not secure under chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-CPA), Goldwasser and Micali introduced the idea of
probabilistic encryption[3] in 1984. Up till now, both quantum public-key
encryption [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and deterministic quantum private-key encryption
[9, 10, 11] have been investigated. In this paper, we first present a classical
private-key encryption scheme with a probabilistic algorithm, then design a
quantum probabilistic algorithm for a private-key encryption scheme. We
shall show that the probabilistic algorithm can increase the unicity distance
of both classical and quantum encryption schemes[12]. Breidbart’s attack on
the four-state quantum cryp-tography scheme has been discussed for many
years now. Bennett et al. [13] proved that Breidbart’s attack is weaker than
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regular basis eavesdropping; Huttner and Ekirt [14] showed that it is more
effective after performing a standard error correction; Yang, Wu, and Liu [15]
improved the second result with an extended BB84 QKD protocol. These
results are based on the effective average Alice/Eve mutual information. In
this paper, we show that the POVM of Breidbart’s attack yields the maxi-
mum classical trace distance. This implies that Breidbart’s attack is the best
measurement for the quantum bit string.
2. The quantum probabilistic private-key encryption scheme
2.1. Classical private-key encryption with probabilistic algorithm
Let the triplet (E , S,D) be a classical private-key encryption scheme,
where E ,D are two polynomial-time classical algorithms, and S is a set of
classical keys. We construct the classical probabilistic private-key encryption
scheme as a quintet (H,Λ, E , S,D), where Hλ ∈ H are polynomial-time algo-
rithms indexed by λ ∈ Λ = {1, 2 · · · , l}. Each Hλ has a polynomial-time in-
verse algorithm. Considering a block cipher with length k, which is the length
of the key, let the plaintext m be divided into n blocks, m = (m1, m2 · · ·mn).
The process then works as follows:
1. The sender Alice and receiver Bob preshare a classical key s ∈ S.
2. For the plaintext mi, Alice first randomly chooses λi,and performs Hλi
on this block, obtains Hλi(mi).
3. Alice performs E on Hλi(mi) and s, and it outputs Cλi = E(Hλi(mi)).
Alice send Cλi to Bob.
4. Bob performs D on Cλi and s, and obtains Hλi(mi). He then tries
to decrypt l times with different H−1
λ′
i
and gets H−1
λ′
i
(Hλi(mi)), λ′i =
1, · · · , l.
Since there is more than one plaintext left after decryption, Bob has to
select one making use of the redundancy of plaintext. A similar type scheme
of public-key encryption had been considered by Rabin [16].
For the encryption algorithm defined by (E , S,D), assume the time com-
plexities t1 for E , t2 for D, t3 for Hλ, and t4 for H−1λ
1. The new complexity for encryption is n× (t1 + t3).
2. The new complexity for decryption is n× (t2 + 12 l × t4).
3. The new complexity for exhaustive attack is 2k × n× (t2 + ln × t4).
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This result shows that raising polynomial time complexity in encryption and
decryption leads to exponentially growing time complexity for exhaustive
attack.
2.2. Quantum probabilistic private-key encryption scheme
Assume the two parties Alice and Bob share a bit-string s = s1, s2 · · · , sk
as their private key. Define
Ωk0 = {r ∈ {0, 1}k|r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rk = 0},
and
Ωk1 = {r ∈ {0, 1}k|r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rk = 1}.
The plaintexts are m = m1 · · ·mn. Alice encrypts them bit by bit as follow:
[Encryption E ]
1. Alice randomly selects r(i) ∈ Ωkmi .
2. Alice prepares the quantum state
|φmi〉 = |r(i)1 〉s1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |r(i)k 〉sk . (1)
3. Alice sends the state |φmi〉 to Bob.
The density operator of the ciphertext encrypted from mi is:
ρ(mi, s, r
(i)) = |r(i)1 〉s1〈r(i)1 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |r(i)k 〉sk〈r(i)k |. (2)
where
|0〉0 ≡ |0〉, |1〉0 ≡ |1〉, |0〉1 ≡ |+〉, |1〉1 ≡ |−〉. (3)
After receiving the ciphertexts, Bob measures them using the private key.
We can see that the state Bob gets is:
ρB =
1
NB
n⊗
i=1
∑
r(i),mi
ρ(mi, s, r
(i)), (4)
where NB = 2
n×k.
[Decryption D]
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1. Bob measures the ciphertext state using the value of s. The ciphertext
state of mi will collapse to r
(i) with probability 1.
2. Bob calculates mi = r
(i)
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r(i)k .
In this scheme, the attacker Eve does not have s, r(i), and m, so if she
intercepts the quantum channel and gets the state, she will get the state:
ρE =
1
NE
n⊗
i=1
∑
s,r(i),mi
ρ(mi, s, r
(i)), (5)
where NE = 2
2k×n.
3. Attack to the key
If we assume that the plaintext is completely random, we obtain the
following:
Lemma 1. If Eve had any method F for accessing the information in the key
from the ciphertext state, This would contradict the no-signalling postulate.
Proof. Let |r〉s = |r1〉s1 · · · |rk〉sk be the state obtained by Eve. This satisfy
Eq. (3). Because the plaintext is truly random, so the ri must also be truly
random.
Assuming Eve had a method F that could gain information about the
key from the state of ciphertext, so that F(|r〉s) = s, then Alice and Eve
could achieve superluminal signalling with the entangled channel. For k = 1
the superluminal signalling process would be as follow:
[Superluminal signalling]
1. Alice prepares entangled state |φ〉 =
√
2
2
(|00〉 + |11〉), sends one party
of it to Eve and keeps the other one herself.
2. If b = 0, when Alice wants to transmit the information b, she uses the
basis |0〉, |1〉 to measure the qubit she kept. Then |φ〉 will collapse to
|00〉 or |11〉 with probability 1/2 for each, and at the same time, the
qubit Eve gets will collapse to |0〉0 or |1〉0 with probability 1/2 for each.
3. If b = 1, the basis used to measure the qubit is |+〉, |−〉. Then |φ〉 will
collapse to |++〉 or | − −〉 with probability 1/2 for each, so the qubit
Eve gets will collapse to |0〉1 or |1〉1 with probability 1/2 for each.
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4. Eve uses F to get the basis of the qubit, with the results F(|r〉s) = s =
b.
Hence Alice and Eve achieve superluminal signalling. If Alice wants to
transmit more bits, she can share more entangled states and repeat this
scheme time after time. The random collapse corresponds to the random
distribution of the plaintexts.
As superluminal signalling is not allowed by the no-signalling postulate,
there can be no such F . 
When the plaintexts have a random distribution, direct attack on the
key can be used to build a superluminal signalling scheme. In fact, the
plaintexts cannot have this property. In this context, we thus make the
following conjecture:
Conjecture 2. If the plaintexts m have a pseudo-random distribution, direct
attack on the key s should not be possible..
This conjecture implies that, in order to make the scheme secure, we can
transform the plaintext by a one-way trapdoor permutation such as RSA.
On the basis of this conjecture, we get the following corollary:
corollary 3. The scheme can resist the attack to the key if the plaintext m
has pseudo-random distribution.
4. Attack to the plaintext
If Eve attacks the information in the key s with method F , she can of
course get the information in the plaintexts m. But even if Eve has a method
G for accessing the information in m, this does not mean that she can get
the information in s. We will show that Eve also has no such G.
4.1. Indistinguishability
Goldrich defined indistinguishability for the classical private-key encryp-
tion scheme[17]. Here we define information-theoretic indistinguishability
for a quantum private-key encryption scheme. With definition 5.2.3 in [17]
Goldrich defined the indistinguishability for private-key encryption of clas-
sical message.Here we propose the information-theoretic indistinguishability
for quantum private-key encryption.
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Definition 1. A quantum encryption (G,E,D) is information theoretically
indistinguishable if for every quantum circuit family {Cn}, every positive
polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n’s, and every x, y ∈ {0, 1}poly(n)(i.e.,|x| =
|y|), ∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1]
∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
, (6)
where the encryption algorithm E should be quantum algorithm, G is a in-
ternal coin tosser of algorithm, and the ciphertext E(x), E(y) are quantum
states.
Remark 1. In Subsection 5.5.2 of Ref.[17], Goldrich states that his defi-
nition of indistinguishability for the classical private-key encryption scheme
is computational when the classical circuit family is polynomial-size, and
information-theoretic when the classical circuit family was no limits on size.
In both Ref.[18] and this paper, information-theoretic security or indis-
tinguishability are all defined using a quantum circuit family {Cn} without
size limits. Furthermore, we think of indistinguishability as a kind of security
that can be classified by three different conditions:
1. If the quantum circuit family {Cn} is polynomial-size, the above defi-
nition defines computational indistinguishability.
2. If the quantum circuit family {Cn} has no size limits, it delivers the
above definition.
3. if the quantum circuit family {Cn} has a specifical exponential-size
determined by the protocol, we define it as physical indistinguishability
of protocol.
This classification can also be extended to semantic security and non-
malleability. It should be noted that the physical security here concerns
the protocol, it is different from the physical security of the system, which
means physical isolation of the security system. For example, the quantum
bit commitment protocol in [18] is a physically secure scheme, because the
unitary matrix for the attack operation is physically incomputable. In fact,
physical security of algorithms can satisfy all the security requirements of
human beings.
In fact, physical security of algorithms can satisfy all the security require-
ments of human beings.
Next, we give a sufficient condition for information theoretic indistin-
guishability.
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Figure 1: the classification of security
Theorem 4. For all plaintexts x and y, let the density operators of cipher
states E(x) and E(y) be ρx and ρy, respectively. A quantum private-key en-
cryption is said to be information theoretically indistinguishable if, for every
positive polynomial p(·) and every sufficiently large n’s,
D(ρx, ρy) <
1
p(n)
. (7)
Proof. Here we follow the proof of Theorem 1 in Ref. [18]). Define Sx
as the set of all states Eve could receive when the plaintext is x. For every
quantum circuit family {Cn},
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(x)) = 1]
=
∑
ρix∈Sx
pi · Pr[Cn(ρix ⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(
∑
ρix∈Sx
piρ
i
x ⊗ σ) = 1]
= Pr[Cn(ρx ⊗ σ) = 1], (8)
where σ is the density operator of service bits of Cn.
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Similarly,
Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(y)) = 1] = Pr[Cn(ρy ⊗ σ) = 1]. (9)
Every method of attack for distinguishing two density operators corre-
sponds to a positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) {Em}. Let pm =
Tr(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ)Em), and qm = Tr(Cn(ρy ⊗ σ)Em) be the probabilities of mea-
surement results labeled by m. Then we have:∣∣∣Pr[Cn(ρx ⊗ σ) = 1]− Pr[Cn(ρy ⊗ σ) = 1]
∣∣∣
≤ max
{Em}
1
2
∑
m
|Tr[Em(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ)− Cn(ρy ⊗ σ))]|
= max
{Em}
D(pm, qm)
= D(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ), Cn(ρy ⊗ σ)). (10)
Since
D(Cn(ρx ⊗ σ), Cn(ρy ⊗ σ)) ≤ D(ρx ⊗ σ, ρy ⊗ σ) = D(ρx, ρy) < 1
p(n)
, (11)
it follows that∣∣∣Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(ρx)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(EG(1n)(ρy)) = 1]
∣∣∣ < 1
p(n)
, (12)
which, according to the Definition 1, proves the theorem. 
4.2. Analysis of the scheme
In the scheme, r is a random string selected by Alice, so r and the private
key s are unknown to Eve. Let ρb = ρ
k
b be the density operator of cipher E(b),
while the length of s and r is k. For Eve, the density operator ρk0 should take
all possible values of s and r ∈ Ωk0, and similarly, ρk1 should take all possible
values of s and r ∈ Ωk1. These density operators can be written as:
ρ0 =
1
22k−1
∑
r∈Ωk0 ,s
|r1〉s1〈r1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |rk〉sk〈rk|,
and
ρ1 =
1
22k−1
∑
r∈Ωk1 ,s
|r1〉s1〈r1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |rk〉si〈rk|. (13)
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It can be seem that
ρk0 =
ρk−10 ⊗ ρ10 + ρk−11 ⊗ ρ11
2
(14)
ρk1 =
ρk−10 ⊗ ρ11 + ρk−11 ⊗ ρ10
2
. (15)
Then we have
D(ρk0, ρ
k
1)
=
1
2
tr|ρ
k−1
0 ⊗ ρ10 + ρk−11 ⊗ ρ11
2
− ρ
k−1
0 ⊗ ρ11 + ρk−11 ⊗ ρ10
2
|
=
1
4
tr|(ρk−10 − ρk−11 )⊗ (ρ10 − ρ11)|. (16)
For every density operator τ1, τ2, we have
|τ1 ⊗ τ2| = |τ1| ⊗ |τ2|.
Then Eq.(16) is equivalent to
1
4
tr(|ρk−10 − ρk−11 | ⊗ |ρ10 − ρ11|)
=
1
2
tr|ρ10 − ρ11| ×
1
2
tr|ρk−10 − ρk−11 |
= D(ρ10, ρ
1
1)×D(ρk−10 , ρk−11 ). (17)
Repeating the above process, we have
D(ρk0, ρ
k
1) = (D(ρ
1
0, ρ
1
1))
k. (18)
Note that
ρ00 =
1
2
(|0〉〈0|+ |+〉〈+|) = 1
4
[
3 1
1 1
]
,
ρ01 =
1
2
(|1〉〈1|+ |−〉〈−|) = 1
4
[
1 −1
−1 3
]
,
so we have D(ρ10, ρ
1
1) =
√
2
2
, and hence
D(ρk0, ρ
k
1) = (
√
2
2
)k. (19)
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This trace distance refers to the encryption of one bit. As the security
of the scheme is based on the trace distance between two plaintext states
encrypted from any bit strings x and y, there must be an upper bound nk
determined by the length of the key s such that, when the length of plaintexts
x and y is less than nk, the scheme can satisfy
D(ρx, ρy) ≤ 1
p(n)
.
This bound, which makes the scheme secure, has not work out yet.
5. Quantum unicity distance
Even if the plaintexts have been coded with a one-way trapdoor permu-
tation which makes them pseudo-random, they should still have redundancy.
So when the ciphertexts encrypted by the same key are long enough, the
scheme must be attacked by trying every possible key, which means our
scheme has a limited unicity distance[19].
Assume that attacker Eve can distinguish a pseudo-random string when
it is longer than a sufficiently large N . On this premise, if Eve gets more
than k×2k×N ciphertext states, she can divided these states into 2k groups,
each corresponding to more than N plaintexts. Eve can then decrypt these
groups of ciphertext states with 2k different bit-strings taking from key space
respectively. While the unique key yields a pseudo-random string, other keys
all yield a random string. Finally, Eve will distinguish the decrypted string
and access the private key.
Besides N , the quantum unicity distance of our scheme is at least an
exponential function of k. This result is based on the improvement due to
probabilistic encryption.
On the other hand, for a quantum deterministic private-key encryption
scheme, the unicity distance should be much less than that of our scheme.
We adopt a scheme based on the quantum private channel, for example.
The encryption process can be represented by
|b〉 → Hs1Xs2 |b〉, (20)
where s1 and s2 are a pair of keys, so that the private key with length k can
encrypt k
2
bits each time.
Similarly, we assume that Eve can distinguish a pseudo-random string
whenever its length is more than a sufficiently large N . This time she does
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not need as many as k × 2k ×N . While each pair of keys has four different
possibilities independent from other pairs, 4 ciphertext state can result a
right plaintext for testing every possibilities of one pair of keys. Then 4×N
ciphertext states encrypted from this pair of keys can certainly result N right
plaintexts. Since there are k/2 pairs of keys, so 2k×N ciphertext states can
fix the whole key. Although these key ciphertexts may be nonadjacent, it
would take little more than N ciphertext states to distinguish a pseudo-
random string. However, it should be noted that 2k × N is much smaller
than k × 2k ×N .
From this result, we see that the quantum unicity distance of the quantum
deterministic private-key encryption scheme may be O(k)×N which is much
smaller than the quantum unicity distance for the probabilistic case, viz.,
O(2k)×N .
6. The Breidbart’s attack
There exists a way [18] to calculate the upper bound of the trace distance
of ρ0 and ρ1 defined in Eq.(13). Let
σ0 =
1
2(k−1)
∑
i
|ϕi1〉〈ϕi1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕik〉〈ϕik |, (21)
where |ϕ0〉 = |+〉, |ϕ1〉 = |1〉}, i ∈ {0, 1}k, and i1 ⊕ i2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ik = 0.
Similarly,
σ0 =
1
2(k−1)
∑
i
|ϕi1〉〈ϕi1| ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ϕik〉〈ϕik |, (22)
where i1 ⊕ i2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ik = 1.
It can be shown with [20, 21, 22] that
D(σ0, σ1) = (sin
pi
4
)
k
= (
√
2
2
)k. (23)
We define a trace-preserving quantum operation U with operation ele-
ments
Ui1i2···ik = (
√
2
2
)kH i1 ⊗ · · · ⊗H ik , (i1, i2, . . . , ik) ∈ {0, 1}k, (24)
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where H0 is unit operator, and H1 is the Hadamard operator:
H1 =
√
2
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
.
Since
H i|+〉 =
{ |+〉 (i = 0)
|0〉 (i = 1)
H i|1〉 =
{ |1〉 (i = 0)
|−〉 (i = 1) , (25)
we have
U(σ0) =
∑
i
Uiσ0U
†
i = ρ0. (26)
similarly, we have
U(σ1) = ρ1.
Then, based on the property of trace-preserving quantum operation,
D(ρ0, ρ1) = D(U(σ0),U(σ1)) ≤ D(σ0, σ1) = (
√
2
2
)k. (27)
We now use Breidbart’s attack to get the lower bound of the trace dis-
tance. For ρk0 and ρ
k
1, when Eve adopts Breidbart’s attack, the difference be-
tween probabilities collapsing to r = 0 · · ·0 can be calculated using Eqs.(15)
as:
P0···0(ρk0)− P0···0(ρk1) =
1
2
(P0···0(ρk−10 )− P0···0(ρk−11 ))(P0(ρ10)− P0(ρ11)),
Repeating the iteration, we have
P0···0(ρk0)− P0···0(ρk1) = 2× (
P0(ρ
1
0)− P0(ρ11)
2
)k. (28)
It is well known that
P0(ρ
1
0) = cos
2 pi
8
, P0(ρ
1
1) = sin
2 pi
8
,
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so we have
P0(ρ
1
0)− P0(ρ11) =
√
2
2
;
similarly,
P1(ρ
1
0)− P1(ρ11) = −
√
2
2
.
Hence
P0···0(ρk0)− P0···0(ρk1) = 2× (
1
2
×
√
2
2
)k.
Extending this result to a random r = r1 · · · rk, the difference is
Pr1···rk(ρ
k
0)− Pr1···rk(ρk1) = 2× (−1)w(r)(
1
2
×
√
2
2
)k. (29)
where w(r) is the number of 1’s in r.
Define βr = Pr(ρ0), γr = Pr(ρ1). After Breidbart’s attack, the classical
trace distance is
D(βr, γr) =
1
2
∑
r
|βr − γr| = (
√
2
2
)k.
Since
D(ρ0, ρ1) = max{Ei}
D(pr, qr),
this maximization is over all POVMs {Ei}. We then obtain
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≥ (
√
2
2
)k (30)
From Eqs.(27) and (30),
D(ρ0, ρ1) = (
√
2
2
)k (31)
Note that the POVM of Breidbart’s attack results in the maximum Kol-
mogorov distance over all POVMs. This leads to:
Conjecture 5. For a conjugate coding qubit-string, Breidbart’s attack may
gain most information.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present a quantum probabilistic encryption algorithm
for a private-key encryption scheme based on conjugate coding. We first
prove that our scheme can resist attack to the key, invoking the no-signalling
postulate. Second, we investigate the scheme’s security against plaintext at-
tack, appealing to the concept of information-theoretic indistinguishability
of the encryption scheme. Third, we show that, compared with the quantum
deterministic private-key encryption scheme, probabilistic encryption greatly
increases the unicity distance. Finally, a conjecture is made regarding Brei-
dbart’s attack.
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